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ORIENTATIONAL PLURALISM IN RELIGION 
S. Mark Heim 
Nicholas Rescher has advanced an account of philosophy which he calls 
orientational pluralism. It addresses the tension in philosophy between 
commitment to rational argument and the enduring lack of resolution of 
major issues. This article suggests that Rescher's view can be fruitfully 
transposed into a discussion of religious pluralism, illuminating the status 
of theories about religious diversity and providing grounds both for recog-
nizing the legitimacy of diverse religious convictions and making a consis-
tent argument in favor of one's own. 
The theological argument over exclusivism, inclusivism and plural-
ism as approaches to religious diversity is crosscut by two different 
ways of conceiving the problem.' In the first, religious commitment is 
largely understood as the assertion of propositions. The power of this 
approach rests in the fact that all faiths can be taken to entail proposi-
tional presuppositions. Thus Paul Griffiths in his An Apology for 
Apologetics can make a very compelling case for the inevitable clash of 
categories which attends religious pluralism.2 Implicitly and explicitly, 
he maintains, religious faith itself appeals to some standard of rationali-
ty. Even though emphasis might be put on a practice, like repeating the 
confession "There is no God but God and Muhammad is his prophet," 
and a positive subjective attitude attained in this practice, it is still the 
case that both practice and attitude presuppose the truth of certain 
propositions about God and the prophet. Griffiths' argument is consid-
erably strengthened by the recognition that this propositional dimension 
does not exhaust the content of religion. Apologetic engagement is 
required only in certain circumstances. fnterreligious encounter may 
involve propositional conflict and agreement but is hardly limited to 
them. At times they will be decidedly secondary considerations. 
By contrast, a second approach stresses constitutive, non-proposition-
al elements: ritual, community, affect, meaning. As the first perspective 
would point out that these all in fact imply propositions, so this view 
emphasizes that propositions depend upon contexts. They not only meet 
or fail rational texts, but express values, serve functions. W.e. Smith for 
instance makes his well-known case for human "faith"-an existential 
attitude-as the universal substance of religion." Here the evaluative, 
dispositional aspects of religion come uppermost. Such faith always 
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takes a particular historical form and that form involves propositions. 
But these propositions should be understood as variant expressions of a 
single faith rather than as constituent components of differing faiths. 
"One's faith is given by God, one's beliefs by one's century."" 
In the two examples I have given, Smith argues for a common core of 
religion and Griffiths for a certain incommensurability between faiths. 
But either type of approach, non-propositional or propositional, can be 
used to argue for either identity or conflict. Some share Griffiths' propo-
sitional focus but argue for a universal shared cognitive content of the 
great traditions, perhaps in a common set of ethical prescriptions. A 
strong cultural-linguistic approach like George Lindbeck's would incline 
to agree with Smith that faith cannot be identified with propositions, but 
would argue that the religions remain distinct forms of life.5 
Most theological treatments of religious pluralism approach the issue pri-
marily along one of these paths and do their best to take secondary account 
of the other. Reasonableness and truth are the deep concerns of one; commit-
ment and meaning the deep concerns of the other. The fundamental 
quandry is how one might recognize the various religious traditions as offer-
ing effective ways of life (leading to moral and personal transformation, 
states of religious fulfillment) and at the same time affirm real cognitive 
value in the distinctive tenets of the religions (even though these may contra-
dict each other in substance). John Hick has offered the most thorough plu-
ralist response to this quandry, arguing that the various religions are soterio-
logically effective because they are culturally diverse ways of expressing the 
identical cognitive truth that there is an ultimate reality in adjustment to 
which humans may be transformed toward a limitlessly better possibility.6 
In response to this rather thin and abstract truth, both Joseph Runzo and 
Robert McKim have sought solutions which would allow more significant 
cognitive value to the differing convictions of the faiths. McKim argues that 
God may have more than one nature.7 Runzo argues for "religious rela-
tivism," the notion that a number of varying religious world views may be 
equally correct versions of the "the way the world is," and thus truly 
describe different phenomenal divine realities.' McKim and Runzo deny that 
differing cognitive religious beliefs must be relegated to the status of symbol-
ic representations of one more general truth. They can rightly be held in 
opposition to each other, without falling back into a pure subjectivism. 
My argument is that a fuller integration of the propositionalist and 
non-propositionalist approaches-showing the sphere and necessity of 
each element-may further clarify approaches like those of McKim and 
Runzo. It can do so by clarifying the status of theories of religious diver-
sity. Such theories stand among and not above religious perspectives: 
most particularly they stand among religious perspectives on the reli-
gions. The question is what kind of theories can most consistently and 
coherently acknowledge this about themselves. 
I 
New light on this problem comes from some recent work in philoso-
phy. In Nicholas Rescher's book The Strife of Systems, he outlines a view 
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which he calls "orientational pluralism."9 Although Rescher is explicitly 
concerned with recent philosophical debates about objectivity and rela-
tivism, his arguments intersect powerfully with the issues of religious 
pluralism. He specifies a way of philosophically respecting "non-philo-
sophical" factors in our search for truth. He addresses the dilemma phi-
losophy faces in reconciling its foundational commitment to the efficacy 
and relevance of rational argument with the apparent permanence of 
pluralism on all substantive philosophical questions. 
He recognizes that in contemporary philosophy there is a tension 
between those who maintain the classic view that the discipline's raison 
d' ctrc is the search for truth through rational analysis and those who 
hold that philosophy's true role is much more limited. This true role 
may be seen by some as purely technical, the clarification of progress 
from premise to conclusion. The philosopher is a kind of logical plumber 
who may be called in to clear the pipes in any kind of argument, with 
professional indifference to the premises and conclusions in question. 
Others may see the philosopher's true role as a therapeutic one, foster-
ing a constant category-loosening play of conversation which exorcises 
the misleading myth of truth itself. This tension between a "classical" 
approach to philosophy and its more contextual alternatives stands as 
an analogy to the propositional and more contextualist approaches to 
religious diversity outlined above. Indeed, in one sense it represents the 
clash today between modern and postmodern sensibilities. 
Since Descartes, skeptics have echoed his lament that philosophy has 
been "cultivated by the very best minds which have ever existed over 
several centuries and that, nevertheless, not one of its problems is not 
subject to disagreement, and consequently is uncertain." III Contemporary 
philosophers, steeped in the sociology of knowledge, are hesitant to 
expect any end to the situation Descartes described. Philosophy faces its 
own problem of pluralism: there appears to be not one rational truth but 
many. And this casts in question the validity of the entire philosophical 
project. Rescher's contention, in brief, is that philosophy as a discipline 
can accommodate itself to this enduring lack of convergence while at the 
same time retaining belief in a unified reality and commitment to the 
most vigorous doctrinal debate. 
He reviews and rejects three possible responses to the philosophical 
situation. ll Their similarity to approaches in the discussion of religious 
pluralism are evident. One response he calls the unique reality view: 
reality has a determinate character, and only one of the competing 
descriptions of it can be most rationally adequate. Another he calls the 
"no-reality" view. There is no ultimate reality or at least none that can be 
known. Therefore philosophical "truth" problems are pseudo-problems 
which need to be reconceived, not answered or argued. The task of 
philosophers is to tease people out of their bondage to this mirage. The 
third view affirms a multi-faceted reality. Each competing view gives 
truth, but none gives the whole truth. Reality is the sort of thing that 
contrasting rational views can be right about. He quotes Nelson 
Goodman: "There is no one way the world is, but there are ways the 
world is."12 
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In place of any of these, Rescher advocates what he calls "orientation-
al pluralism." One and only one position is rationally appropriate from a 
given perspective, but we must recognize that there are a diversity of 
perspectives. The distinctive thing about his view is the insistence that a 
practicing philosopher rightly and inevitably maintains both that there 
is one unique reality with which some understandings most fully corre-
spond and that there is a wider range of understandings which are 
equally rationally defensible. Argument and inquiry can only operate 
from a perspective. From a given perspective there is ultimately only 
one rationally defensible conclusion. We seek to discover what this is 
and insofar as we believe we do, we may rightly hold that it is more 
valid than conclusions reached from other perspectives. 
It is important to note how Rescher's position differs from the simple 
affirmation that reality is multi-faceted. That affirmation points toward a 
possible all-inclusive position by accumulation. The perspectival view 
by contrast affirms an irreducible plurality. Facets can be combined, 
while perspectives cannot. Perspectives are one (at a time) to a 
customer.13 We can illustrate the difference through the parable of the 
blind persons and the elephant which is so overworked in discussions of 
religious pluralism. The story classically demonstrates the way appar-
ently conflicting conclusions stem from various limited perspectives on 
the same reality. One person, feeling the trunk, believes it to be a snake. 
Another feels a leg and believes it is a tree. Yet another touches the ele-
phant's flank and insists it is a wall. The story of course is told from the 
point of view of the sighted person among the blind. l4 It is laughably 
obvious that blind persons could dispel their naive dogmas in a few 
moments, quickly accumulating all of each other's relevant experience of 
trunk, legs, flank and assimilating them to an identical cumulative pic-
ture. Thus might different facets be combined. But the world is not an 
elephant. A single life can gather only one very small thread of the 
whole, and can gather it only from a limited number of perspectives. 
This "exclusion principle" is personal as well as logical. While it vio-
lates the principle of non-contradiction to say that at the same moment I 
both see and do not see a train, there is no contradiction involved in say-
ing that another person sees it and I do not. And there is no logical prob-
lem in saying a train is seen by two people at once-one from inside and 
one from outside-though it is not possible for the same person to be 
doing the seeing in both cases. Recognizing a diversity of perspectives 
allows us to say that contradictory statements can both be true, of differ-
ent persons with different perspectives. It also allows us to say that two 
things, which are not logically incompatible, may be mutually exclusive 
for any individual or community at one time. So the "exclusion" Rescher 
has in mind deals as much with personal states that cannot both hold at 
the same time for the same person as with contradictory propositions. 
Rescher roots his discussion in consideration of what he calls "aporet-
ic clusters." These are families of contentions each of which has a strong 
evidential claim but which are mutually incompatible: the underside of 
an Aristotelian syllogism. As an example Rescher notes three proposi-
tions on virtue widely held by the Greeks: 
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0) If virtue does not always produce happiness/pleasure, then it is 
pointless 
(2) Virtue is not pointless-indeed it is extremely important 
(3) Virtue does not always yield happiness." 
Philosophy arises precisely because we find ourselves situated in 
such thickets when we try to make sense of what already makes sense to 
us. Each statement in the cluster is highly plausible but they cannot all 
be right. Nor, Rescher says, can we appeal to the evidence to decide the 
matter: what the cluster of statements express is the evidence, as best we 
can determine. 
Something must be sacrificed-something with a strong appeal-if 
consistency is to be achieved. Different philosophical "doctrines" arise 
from various ways of resolving the inconsistency. In the case above, one 
path to consistency is to deny 0) and maintain that virtue is worthwhile 
entirely in itself even if it does not produce happiness/pleasure. Rescher 
says this was the the path taken by Epictetus and Stoics. Another option 
is to drop (2) and maintain virtue is pointless, like Plato's Thrasymachus. 
A third option is to deny (3) and hold that virtue is inevitably produc-
tive of happiness, a path Rescher attributes to Plato. The key point 
Rescher stresses is that this choice itself cannot be made purely on the 
basis of evidence and reason. It requires recourse to evaluative judge-
ments or commitments. 
Philosophy thus always presents us with overabundant material, an 
excess of empirically grounded, rationally defensible propositions. We 
can't have them all. Without such decisions philosophy can hardly 
begin. In deciding which to keep and which to let go, we depend upon 
an evaluation of priorities. Such judgements define the constraints of 
what C01l11tS as a solution. Epistemic values have to do with the para-
digms we favor, with what we mean or want to mean by "knowledge."l(, 
These will be quite different, Rescher suggests, if our model of knowl-
edge is taken from mathematics (Spinoza) or from literature (Derrida). It 
is these epistemic values which constitute an "orientation," from which 
"orientational pluralism" takes its name. 
Rescher offers the following aporetic triad to illustrate his own view.17 
0) Philosophical problems are legitimate and solvable cognitive 
issues 
(2) Solution to philosophical problems is only achievable through 
recourse to cognitive values 
(3) Recourse to values is illegitimate in rational inquiry 
Orientational pluralism drops (3). It holds that no philosophical thesis can 
be justified without adopting an evaluative perspective. To assert a thesis is 
also to commend adoption of the orientation in which its warrants rest. 
Orientational pluralism plainly acknowledges that it is a thesis subject 
to all the conditions just described. It can be chosen and defended from 
among alternatives only by evidence combined with evaluative factors. 
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We could drop (2) rather than (3), if we grant a higher priority to certain-
ty and judge the existence of on-going differences more repugnant. 
From an orientation committed to the epistemic values of certainty and 
disciplinary agreement, a thoroughly rational case can be made for this 
view. Philosophy can be conceived and practiced in this way, in other 
words, by radically limiting its scope. 
Orientational pluralism is not intended as a neutral, methodological 
description of how philosophy operates. If any such description is taken 
to have implications for the practice of philosophy, it is already "doctri-
nal." It is not mere description but judgement. Every account of the 
nature of philosophy is a position in philosophy. Orienta tiona I pluralism 
thus understands itself as an alternative to views like the one described 
in the last paragraph, on the same categorical level. It is frankly norma-
tive and doctrinal. It says that its description of how philosophy oper-
ates is true, and that the recognition of a variety of tenable rational views 
is compatible with "doctrinal" commitment to one of those views-in 
this case to orientational pluralism-since such a diversity of rational 
possibilities is what this doctrine expects. 
Rescher argues, in effect, that we necessarily assert the validity of our 
own perspective in the process of exercising it. It is both irrational and 
dishonest to argue otherwise. We can recognize the existence of differing 
outlooks, and recognize that conclusions can be reached from these out-
looks by means every bit as rational as those used to reach contrasting 
conclusions within another orientation. Yet at the same time we are enti-
tled to maintain the universal validity of our own views and we may 
expect others to do no less for their own. The evaluative judgements that 
significantly constitute epistemological orientations do not preclude 
such claims: they are what makes them possible. The possibility of any-
thing like objective knowledge depends on the optimal combination of 
effective reason and appropriate orienta tiona 1 priorities. 
The case for orientational pluralism then has two fronts. On the ratio-
nal side Rescher stresses the consistency with which it can apply its prin-
ciples to its own case, a consistency lacking in many competitors, includ-
ing pluralistic theories of religion. One perspective on the nature of phi-
losophy, for instance, maintains that evidential considerations alone will 
lead to a single rational conclusion. But this view itself is is not agreed to 
be the single rational conclusion of the evidence. To claim that only 
purely rational arguments should be allowed is to adopt one kind of 
value orientation. Evidence can clearly show that other value orienta-
tions exist. And if we acknowledge that evaluative orientations crucially 
shape our conclusions and that there is no purely rational way to choose 
a single orientation over all others, then we contradict our assertion that 
evidence necessarily leads to only one rational interpretation. As 
Rescher puts it, "if you share my values then by rational rights you 
should share my position. If not, you can look elsewhere .. .indeed you 
must."l" The availability of other rationally tenable views is consistent 
with what orientational pluralism asserts in claiming to be the most ade-
quate account of philosophy. 
On a second front, supporters of orientational pluralism make frank 
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evaluative arguments. Philosophy struggles between a rationally rigor-
ous practice that risks becoming largely irrelevant to primary human 
questions and an engagement with those great questions frustrated by 
the failure to find agreed answers. Rescher suggests that his account of 
the options best allows us to understand and practice philosophy as a 
rigorous cognitive activity which also bears on large, live human ques-
tions. '9 There is no determinative rational argument that philosophy 
must be construed to combine these two functions and in no other way. 
But if it is to be understood in this way-if rationality and human rele-
vance are both evaluative priorities-then Rescher argues that orienta-
tiona 1 pluralism is the single best rational account of it. It is the true 
account of philosophy from this evaluative perspective, the perspective 
Rescher holds and commends to others. 
In summary, orientational pluralism insists there is only one reality 
and we are trying to know it. It is not committed to regarding other sub-
stantive views as equally valid, only as tenable from different perspec-
tives. What is fragmented is not truth but justification or warranted 
assertability. The justification offered by a philosophy may be orienta-
tionally limited in appeal, but the claims themselves can be universal 
and unrestricted.20 People who rationally hold contradictory views from 
different orientations are each justified in thinking the other wrong. 
"We can only pursue the truth by cultivating our truth."21 
Philosophical positions are not opinions but judgements. And, as 
Rescher strikingly puts it, we are not in a position to concede that some-
one else's basis of judgement is superior to ours. Someone else's exper-
tise or information may well be so. Such data enriches and expands the 
basis for our evaluation. But to acknowledge others have better values 
or beliefs by which to judge is in effect to adopt their perspective and 
drop any other. 
Why does recognition that diverse rational positions are appropriate-
ly held not contradict the conviction that one's own position is more 
valid than the others? There is a common contemporary reflex which 
asserts that to privilege one's own conclusions is the same as denying 
that others are possible or reasonable. This is clearly not so. Suppose a 
person lives her or his life according to conclusions we accept as perfect-
ly rational, but whose premise-that money is the primary end, for 
instance-we do not share. If we go on to say that this premise is allow-
able for them, though we regard it as misguided, we make this judge-
ment on grounds of some kind inextricably bound up with goods we 
value. If we affirm the appropriateness of their pursuing that end while 
we pursue another, we presumably regard this judgement as more valid 
than at least some others, made on other grounds: for instance, the 
judgement that the money-oriented person must be coerced in some 
way to conform to my view. We make a rational judgement about how 
to deal with differences in orientation, and we make it on the basis of 
our orientation. In this we behave formally no differently than the per-
son who would insist that the financier change her ways. One negates 
and the other affirms the viability of this differing evaluative orientation, 
but we both do so by asserting the primacy of our own evaluative orien-
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tations This is an embarrassingly unoriginal observation. But it is rather 
regularly disregarded. We are unable to judge our own grounds of 
judgement to be anything but preferable to alternatives. This is not a 
legalistic but a thoroughly practical contradiction: we cannot act on two 
different orientations at once, even if we understand both are defensible. 
In the end, we are all inclusivists. 
If we say we judge others' orientations to have the same value as our 
own, we are committed to regard the rational conclusions that flow from 
those orientations as equally valid, including the exclusivist conclusion 
that others' orientations do not have the same value. Again, this is not a 
logical debating point. It has a perfectly practical correlative: none of us do 
in our practice, speech and thought grant the same value to the perfectly 
rational conclusions that stem from different orientations. If we insist that 
no privilege attaches to the perspective from which we judge, it seems we 
must claim that we have made this judgement itself without any reference 
to grounds that others do not share. W. C. Smith goes to precisely this 
extremity, insisting that nothing in religion ultimately should be accepted 
by anyone that cannot be accepted by all others, and for the same reasons.22 
He of course must drastically qualify this principle and postpone its real-
ization to the future. In practice, pluralist authors insist that others should, 
or will, or anonymously already do share their particularistic grounds of 
judgement. This is the standard practice of the inclusivism they condemn. 
Philosophy as Rescher views it is a communal venture, "a competitive 
yet quasi-cooperative endeavor to build up as good a case as possible for a 
diversified spectrum of discordant possibilities."23 From the perspective of 
orientational pluralism, the diversity of philosophical systems is not a 
problem but a solution. It serves to challenge people on the one hand to 
include as much evidence and as many values as possible in their under-
standing of the world and on the other to honor the fact that people make 
different commitments and develop in different directions. Discussion 
and argument among the perspectives is the very lifeblood for each one. 
Rescher writes: 
From Hegel's day to ours, philosophers of all persuasions have 
seen the strife of systems as something to be overcome-somehow 
to be put behind us once and for all. Some, following Hegel him-
self-that Napoleon of Philosophy-use the approach of conquest 
and annexation, of seeking to absorb all of philosophy into one 
great synthesis.24 
But in Rescher's view philosophy does not aim at consensus so much 
as it collectively seeks for those in each orientation to develop the most 
sophisticated, most responsible, fullest understanding of the truth possi-
ble. Differing visions of truth are the primary allies in this process and 
communication with and about them its primary medium. 
II 
Rescher has attempted to reconcile the cognitive rigor of philosophy 
with the integral role of perspectival judgment. If he is on the right 
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track-I believe he is-what would a similar approach look like in the 
area of religion? Clearly philosophy and religion are different spheres: 
the evaluative, perspectival elements that have been so problematic for 
post-Enlightenment philosophy are unavoidably central in religion. 
Faith presents an analogous if heightened problem of balance between 
perspective and universality. 
One important point is that Rescher's treatment can appear highly 
individualistic. It might be objected that in religion one's orientation is 
much less a choice than in the philosophical debates he discusses. 
Although the modern experience is one which heightens exactly this 
dimension in religion-the awareness that there are other options-still 
I readily acknowledge the weight of the communal aspect of religion. 
For our purposes however this does not change a great deal. Rescher's 
analysis is valid even if persons do not start de novo religiously. They 
certainly do not do so in philosophy either, where communal traditions 
are also crucial. Most of what Rescher says can be applied to religious 
communities as well as individuals. 
His argument illuminates portions of the current debate about the 
diversity of faiths. Many commentators remark on the ironic exclusive-
ness of pluralistic theologies in their claims to represent the only defen-
sible understanding of religious pluralism." Their representatives gener-
ally respond to such observations not by arguing for the objective truth 
of their account in contrast to the falsity of all others-a response which 
would more or less confirm the charge. Instead they tend to appeal to 
certain experiences, conditions or aims which require some such expla-
nation as they provide. These might include the encounter with noble 
persons of other faiths, the realization of the cultural conditioning of our 
own values, the need for peaceful human relations. The data that plural-
ists identify in this way is generally recognized by those who hold other 
views. There may be no debate about the positive moral qualities of a 
Gandhi or an Ambedkar. And yet pluralists will argue that there can be 
no authentic appreciation of these qualities that does not include recog-
nition of the rough equivalence of the faith traditions in which they 
arose to other traditions. 
In other words, pluralists appeal to an evaluative perspective in which 
these particular elements are assigned a different significance. John Hick, 
the outstanding exponent of a pluralist theory of religion, expounds his 
"pluralistic hypothesis" with great philosophical clarity. He also com-
mends it by clear appeal to an evaluative orientation. 2h He advocates his 
hypothesis as the most effective way to secure 1) real cognitive content 
for religion, 2) substantial parity among the faiths and 3) preservation of 
some standard to detect destructive religion and so avoidance of rela-
tivism. Insofar as one shares these epistemic values, one's argument with 
Hick can deal entirely with the most rational way of realizing them. I 
have dealt with such internal critiques elsewhere.2? But I also have a 
somewhat different evaluative orientation, stressing more concrete cogni-
tive content in the various religions than Hick does, and modifying the 
understanding of parity among the faiths. Rescher's philosopher says "If 
you share my perspective, then I maintain you should recognize my con-
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elusions as the most reasonable ones." Pluralist theologians tend to 
respond to critics "If you don't reach my conclusions, it is because you 
have failed to share my perspective and you ought to do so." This is quite 
what we would expect in orientational pluralism's terms. 
There is a difference here however not to be overlooked. Philosophy 
is constituted by a certain commitment to rational argument, and 
philosophers are traditionally those who accept that methodological 
commitment. The crisis Rescher addresses is a result of the breakdown 
of this methodological agreement. "Religion," despite its confident list-
ing in our academic syllabai, designates no such discipline and the 
adherents of faith traditions make no such common methodological 
commitment. Thus the perspectival diversity that Rescher integrates into 
philosophy, against its ostensible grain, has a much more dramatic 
range in religion considered generally than in philosophy. If anything, 
this should make his conclusions even more applicable for religious life. 
Accounts of religious diversity of any stripe-exclusivist, inclusivist, 
pluralist-are at the same time second level descriptions of religions and 
first level religious assertions. Rescher points out that even in philoso-
phy, where it might seem that there could be some consensual, meta-
doctrinal account of the discipline as a whole (given the ostensible 
methodological agreement), this is not the case. Such accounts are 
inevitably themselves doctrinal in character. This condition is intensi-
fied, not diminished in the field of faiths. It is not that we can't attempt 
and to some extent succeed in empathetically describing various tradi-
tions. But the minute one attempts to draw any kind of conclusion from 
these descriptions one has entered the doctrinal realm. 
What do we mean when we say that others are justified to hold views 
contrasting with ours? I contend that to argue varying views are all 
equally appropriate to hold, for reasons equally agreeable to all, must 
amount either to a full relativism (the agreed grounds being that no 
grounds exist) or a radical imperialism (requiring that all subscribe to 
some particular set of grounds). The first option is only an instance of 
the second. 
Pluralists basically say that the varying views of adherents to differ-
ent faiths are all salvifically effective, but for reasons the pluralist under-
stands and the adherents themselves-with a few exceptions-currently 
do not. 28 Pluralists intend that on this point their views should displace 
all others held by believers in any tradition. In this sense, pluralists do 
not countenance continued diversity. Their account of religious variety 
provides no internal rationale for the continued existence of accounts of 
that religious variety alternative to theirs. At this level they see no more 
reason why they should accept being but one view among many than 
traditional exclusivist perspectives do. 
To use Rescher's idiom, we have the following aporetic cluster: 
(1) More than one type of religious position is valid 
(2) Pluralist theories of religion are religious positions 
(3) Pluralist theories of religion should be accepted to the exclusion 
of all others 
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Exclusivists and to some extent inclusivists affirm first order conflict 
or alternativeness among the faiths. They thus stress the similarity 
between primary faith and meta-theories of religion, in that both are 
partly constituted by evaluative orientations. They thus reject (3). 
Pluralist theologians reject (2), usually not by denying some religious 
quality to their theories but by arguing that they are not religious in the 
same sense as 0). They claim a neutral, or generic religiousness which 
transcends the actual faiths and is not to be classed with them. To make 
good on this claim pluralists bear, and consistently fail, the test of insu-
lating their meta-theories from grounding in any cultural or religious 
particularity.29 
Rescher's approach by contrast treats his own view of what philoso-
phy does as one of the contending doctrines in philosophy itself. 
According to his account, we would expect such contention to continue, 
with each doctrine continuing to make its case over against others. From 
this perspective, one can see why there are and continue to be different 
doctrines, while at the same time maintaining the preferable validity of 
one's own. 
In making the argument Rescher does, he acts in consonance with his 
professed conviction. His argument for his own view against others and 
his affirmation of the appropriateness of other views than his being 
held-and claiming superiority to his-are fully consistent. To regard 
our convictions as "just like anyone else's" is to regard them as the best 
and most truthful that we know. To regard others' differing faiths as "as 
good as ours" is to regard them as making more sense than or being 
preferable to ours, but from a different perspective, one we do not share. 
By contrast, pluralist views are caught in a quandary. To be consistent 
they must maintain that they are not religious views among other reli-
gious views. This would provide some rationale for their claims to 
exclusivism over against alternative views of religious diversity. But it 
would rule out their simultaneous claim to provide a "religious account 
of religion," to be offering a validation of religion in its own terms.'" If 
they acknowledge the religious character of their view, then they must 
apply their stated principles on religious diversity to legitimize positions 
at odds with their own. Very few face this question directly: is a pluralist 
bound to affirm exclusivisms as independently valid religious ways, 
with no intrinsic need of pluralist modification?31 When a clear answer is 
forthcoming, it is an inclusivist one: the pluralist insists that other theo-
ries of religion are defensible only to the extent that they replicate 
("anonymously" perhaps) pluralist views or are consistent with those 
views. What pluralist theories do not provide is a consistent and plausi-
ble ground for making that claim. An orientational pluralist perspective 
seems a significant improvement on this score since it offers a basis for 
both universal claims and acceptance of enduring alternatives to those 
claims, and does not exempt itself from this interpretation as pluralist 
theories do. 
Of course the objection is made: why not see major faiths as equally 
valid, given their different perspectives, and rule out any contention 
among them? The orientational pluralist responds that it is perfectly 
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possible to argue for the equal validity of varying faiths, as one doctrine 
among others. It is not possible to argue plausibly that this is a "non-
doctrinal" position. This is the argument between the pluralists and the 
orientational pluralist over the status of theories of religion. Since both 
are theories of religion, it is an argument over what kind of argument 
we are having. 
The orientational pluralist maintains that this is a doctrinal argument, 
which cannot be resolved except by recourse to evaluative perspectives. 
It is important to note that differences in evaluative orientation need not 
be and most often are not a matter of diametrically opposed judgements. 
Two persons who agree in their assessment of the set of relevant and 
most important evaluative factors may yet diverge decisively in weigh-
ing and applying them. Three orientations may all grant tradition and 
innovation significant claims, but relate them in three different ways. 
Thus the theoretical account of religious diversity is an area in principle 
likely to remain a field of rationally appropriate diverse views. 
For orientational pluralism the diversity of views about religious 
diversity is, like religious diversity itself, rationally justified and likely to 
continue. Pluralists affirm religious diversity, but not the appropriate-
ness of varying views of that diversity. They expect the matter to be set-
tled at the meta-religious level in a way that they would not counte-
nance among the faiths themselves. I maintain that the attitudes which 
theories of religion take up toward competing theories of religion repli-
cate their true attitudes toward the religions themselves, for each of the 
religions itself is also an alternative at this level, having one or more of 
its own theories of religion. 
The pluralist perspectives view themselves as more valid than any other 
accounts of religion. This is an appropriate type of conviction (if concretely 
incorrect) from an orientational pluralist'S perspective. But pluralists 
appear to refuse to grant any legitimacy to other orientations, from which 
alternative rational conclusions would be reached. What the pluralist 
maintains is that if perspectives exist from which it makes sense to have 
any other conviction, those perspectives must be illegitimate or immoral in 
some way. Thus pluralism repeats the dynamic of the strong exclusivism it 
opposes: those who disagree are not rational, not worthy, or both. 
Orientational pluralism, by contrast, recognizes that conflicting views may 
be every bit as rational as my own and, though reflecting an evaluative ori-
entation of a different constellation, based in grounds of judgement which I 
recognize as valid ones, though I order them differently. 
Orienta tiona 1 pluralism thus combines a more thorough-going com-
mitment to the warranted justifiability of pluralism in religion with a 
more positive view toward the actual practice of witness on the part of 
believers who commend their visions to others. It is highly skeptical of 
readiness to attribute others' differing religious attitudes to pure irra-
tionality, immorality or bad faith. It also encourages serious attention to 
the evaluative viewpoints from which neighbors' faiths cohere, since the 
development of our own truth can only proceed by incorporating more 
of what we may come to view as valuable in theirs. This is part and par-
cel of our commitment to the universal import of the truth we believe 
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we partially grasp (otherwise we could rest content in ours and leave 
others to theirs) and of our commitment to learn from as well as differ 
with those who construe the world differently. 
The account which Rescher gives of the importance of discussion 
across philosophical systems has a great deal in common with an insight 
John Cobb offers out of interreligious dialogue. He believes that there is 
"one relatively objective norm" that can be inferred from the practice of 
dialogue-in his case particularly Buddhist-Christian dialogue. He notes 
four features that he believes characterize at least those traditions that 
engage in such encounter. They make some claim to the universal value 
of their affirmations. They teach some measure of humility about our 
capacity to understand reality in its fullness. They tend to develop some 
level of mutual appreciation. And the norms by which they judge both 
themselves and others are enlarged. '2 The last is the key point in Cobb's 
estimation. The "relatively objective" norm which he sees arising from 
such encounter has to do with a religious tradition's "ability in faithful-
ness to its past to be enriched and transformed in its interaction with the 
other traditions."33 
From Cobb's view, there is no reason for religious traditions not to 
bring convictions of uniqueness and the universal validity of their spe-
cial beliefs into dialogue or interfaith relations. These do not need to be 
dropped or bracketed. It is equally of course not the case that each 
instance or type of interfaith interaction needs to focus on such ques-
tions. What dialogue makes possible is for each tradition to develop the 
fullest and most rigorous and inclusive version possible of its distinctive 
convictions and life. Cobb assumes that this necessarily involves trans-
formation for all the traditions. In fact, he is not hesitant to make a claim 
for Christian superiority-the claim that a faith centered on Christ will 
prove to have an unsurpassed capacity for precisely this kind of dia-
logue, inclusion and transformation.34 And he would view it as entirely 
appropriate for those in other traditions to make reciprocal claims. 
Such a vision of dialogue seems very much in line with what orienta-
tional pluralism would imply in the religious area. This is a vision in 
which the religions' claims to distinctiveness and their impulse to wit-
ness are valued along with sensitive appreciation for different commit-
ments. Somewhat ironically then, orientational pluralism finds a good 
deal more in order with the faith traditions' actual perspectives on reli-
gious pluralism than do contemporary pluralist views that ostensibly 
commend respect for the religions' views. 
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